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6  Trade Policies and 
Consequences 
Trade performance is central to Brazilian adjustment to the debt problem. 
With  or  without  debt relief,  net  export earnings must  be  larger than  past 
earnings to pay interest, let alone principal. Such interest claims, even under 
favorable projections, come to more than one-third of  export receipts over 
the next several years. 
Brazil is exceptional among the Latin American countries in its successful 
combination of import substitution and growth, as well as diversification of 
exports from the late 1960s on. Three factors have been responsible. One is 
the  size and  efficiency of  the industrial sector initially established behind 
protectionist barriers and its continuing extension to intermediate and capital 
goods. Second is a crawling peg exchange rate policy that since 1968 has led 
to  repeated  small  devaluations  as  a  response  to  differential  internal  and 
external inflation, thus avoiding long periods of  overvaluation. Third is an 
active promotion of  manufactured exports through subsidies that offset the 
negative effects of import tariffs and controls. 
Together, these circumstances explain the growth of Brazilian merchandise 
exports from 1965 to 1980 of  9.4 percent a year, placing the country ahead 
of  Singapore  and  narrowly  behind  Hong  Kong.  Such  a  performance 
permitted Brazil to follow a strategy of  indebtedness in adjusting to the oil 
shock of  1973. The continuation of  this performance, although attenuated 
since 1980 after the reemergence of the oil shock, has been central to coping 
with the debt. At the same time, Brazil has been able to restrain imports as a 
result of  continuing expansion of alternative domestic supply sources. The 
1980-84  level of  real  imports,  excluding wheat and oil,  is  lower than  in 
1970-74,  despite an increase in output of almost 80 percent. 
Taken together, this combination of export growth and import substitution 
have produced large export surpluses in recent years. Table 6.1 provides the 
numbers  for  the  trade  balance  and  figure  6.1,  an  illustration.  The  trade 
surpluses of  the  1980s have underwritten interest payments of  $10 billion a 
year, along with domestic recovery since 1984. These interest payments and 
recovery,  however,  have  not  been  without  the  attendant  and  cumulative 
internal problems that we have stressed in previous chapters. 
In  this  chapter  we  examine  more  closely  the  policies  that  have  made 
such  an  outcome  possible.  We  begin  with  a  discussion  of  the  import- 
substitution  industrialization  of  the  1950s  and  the  liberalization  of  the 
1960s.  We  then  examine in  more  detail exchange rate  policy  since  1964 
and import and export responsiveness. We  conclude with some thoughts on 
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Table 6.1  Trade Balance (annual averages, in millions of  U.S. dollars) 
Period  Exports  Imports  Trade Balance 
1950-59  1,447 
1960- 69  1,590 
1970-73  3,958 
1974-76  8,917 
1977-78  12,390 
1979-80  17,688 
1981-82  21,734 
1983-85  24,848 
1986  22,393 
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6.1  From Import-substitution Industrialization to Trade 
Liberalization 
Brazilian  trade  policies  after  the  Second  World  War  were  profoundly 
shaped  by  the  experience  of  the  Great  Depression  of  the  1930s.  The 
significant decline in import capacity after 1929 as a result of falling prices 
of  coffee  and  disruption  of  international  capital  markets  created  an 
immediate balance of payments problem. Brazil’s response was to cease debt 
service, limit imports, and expand internal demand. Expansionary fiscal and 
monetary  policies  coupled  with  real  devaluation  and  exchange  licensing 
created  favorable  conditions  for  industrial  development  in  the  1930s. 
Although  one can trace  the beginnings  of  industrialization  from  an  earlier 
period,  the  impetus  of  the  Depression  was  decisive  in  emphasizing  how 
reduced  reliance on international  trade  was  not  only compatible with,  but 
also  favorable  to,  domestic  growth.  By  1939  imports  of  consumer 
nondurables accounted for less than one-tenth of  total supply. Production of 
many other goods was making rapid headway. 
The continuing constraints on imports from the supply side during World 
War  I1  reinforced  the  impulse  to  industrialization  from  the  Depression 
decade. There was a difference. Brazil emerged from the war with a trade 
surplus as a result of expanded exports. The accumulation  of  reserves and 
favorable commodity  prices,  especially the  surge during  the  Korean  War, 
provided  enhanced  import  capacity.  But  liberation  was  temporary.  After 
1947, exchange rate overvaluation and import licensing were used to support 
domestic industrialization and discriminate against primary exports. 
More  sophisticated  rationing  devices  were  progressively  introduced.  In 
1953  an  auction  system  replaced  the  earlier  quantitative  controls.  The 
auctions  functioned  as  a  variable  tariff  system  whose  level  for different 
categories  depended upon the amount of  exchange made available.  At one 
extreme stood wheat, petroleum,  and certain essential  capital goods whose 
imports were facilitated at a special, below-auction rate; at the other extreme 
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Fig. 6.1  Trade balance (in millions of U.S. dollars) 
percent was charged at the time the system was abolished in  1957. Such a 
system  enabled  the  government  to  expropriate  the  surplus  derived  from 
quantitative controls and  to  turn  some of  it  to  subsidizing nontraditional 
exports. 
In  1957 the multiple exchange rate system was simplified as a result of  a 
tariff  refom.  Three  basic  tariff  levels  were  established:  0-10  percent, 
10-60  percent, and 60-150  percent.  In order to establish surcharges, the 
purchase of  many items required exchange procured at special auctions and 
at  a  large  premium  relative  to  the  general  rate.  A  new  administrative 
structure was  set  up  to  grant  discretionary  adjustments to  the  stipulated 
tariffs,  and  the  Law  of  Similars was  reactivated,  limiting importation of 
products already or potentially domestically produced. 
Until  the  end  of  the  1950s,  the  policy  of  favoring  domestic  industry 
worked reasonably well. Overvalucd exchange rates taxed primary exporters 
and converted the gains to the direct advantage of priority importers. It was 
a second-best policy for reallocating resources when the government itself 
could not tax directly. As long as exports were inelastic in their supply (or 
their international prices enjoyed  a  boom),  such  a  strategy was  feasible. 
Over  time,  however,  as  export  elasticity increased,  the  balance of  trade 
deteriorated as export volume stagnated. Foreign direct investment, lured by 
protected  access to  the  Brazilian market  and  granted favorable exchange 
rates,  partially compensated for the deterioration of  the trade balance and 
kept the balance of  payments from similar erosion.  But  that  source, too, 
became smaller after the initial investment in new  sectors was undertaken. 
As  the  balance of  payments became  more  problematic,  so too  did  the 
fiscal position of  the government. As long as import substitution could be 
subsidized by indirect taxes, deficits were avoided. Increasingly, as exchange 
rates had  to be revalued and bonuses provided for nontraditional exports, 338  Eliana A. Cardoso and Albert Fishlow 
that  source disappeared.  At  the  same time,  as industrialization  proceeded, 
demands  upon  the  government  for  investment  in  infrastructure  simulta- 
neously  increased. The  inflation tax  had to substitute  for other sources of 
revenue, as well as meet rising expenditures. It could do so only at the cost 
of  accelerating  inflation rates that reached  annual levels of  30  percent  and 
threatened to go out of  control. 
A classic devaluation with stabilization was attempted in 1961 during the 
short-lived presidency of Janio Quadros. Its failure was followed by accel- 
erating deterioration in both of the external accounts, and internal growth and 
inflation. The coup in March 1964 brought a military government with a new, 
more market-oriented  agenda  and greater authority  with which it could  be 
implemented. 
The 1964-67  period saw a more thorough effort at liberalization than had 
been attempted earlier.  Serious attention was paid to the exchange rate and 
incentives for exports. Import liberalization was much less profound. While 
tariffs  were  lowered  in  1967  and  real  prices  of  imports  fell,  an  equal 
determinant of the price decline was real appreciation of the cruzeiro after its 
initial devaluation  in  1964. Unadjusted  measures of  nominal  and effective 
protection  that  fail  to  allow  for  the  redundancy  of  much  of  the  legal 
provisions-because  no  imports  were  realized  and  domestic  competition 
determined  price-exaggerate  the  changes  after  1964.  Perhaps  the  best 
measure of that redundancy is the limited impact of the large tariff reform in 
1967 on  domestic  industry  or  on  the  composition  of  imports.  Brazilian 
industry was more efficient than simple calculations  of effective protection 
suggest. Some of those estimates are presented  in  the statistical  appendix, 
but must be interpreted with caution. 
On the export side, however, more decisive changes were introduced after 
the change in government. Export incentives for manufactures began in  1964 
with measures reducing the anti-export bias of  value-added taxes. Gradually 
these policies shifted emphasis to credit subsidies that became important in 
the 1970s. Cardoso (1980) computes a time series estimate of the combined 
effect of  fiscal and tax incentives on prices received by exporters. Musalem 
(1981) broadens the estimates by  the inclusion  of financial subsidies.  I  The 





June  1964: Effective  implementation  of  the  drawback  system  (import 
duty exemptions for inputs used in manufactured exports). 
April  1965: Exemption of  the  IPI,  value-added  tax paid  into manufac- 
tured exports and export sales. 
February  1967:  Exemption  of  the  ICM,  value-added  tax  paid  on 
manufactured exports and export sales. 
February  1967: Introduction of  an income tax credit.  A tax refund  was 
granted to exporters of manufactured  products proportional to the share 
of total output exported. 339  BraziUChapter 6 
5.  July  1968:  Creation  of  an  IPI  credit  consisting  of  a  subsidy  for 
6.  September 1971: Creation of  an ICM subsidy similar to that for the IPI. 
This  system  of  subsidies was  a  source of  increasing conflict  with  the 
United States in the 1970s. At the end of the decade it was agreed to phase 
out  the  tax  subsidy-as  opposed to  exemption-components,  and  initial 
steps were taken. The seriousness of the debt crisis in the early 1980s led to 
the reinstatement of  subsidy payments. 
A second major decision was the adoption of  the crawling peg exchange 
rate regime in August 1968. It was designed to avoid the discontinuity of the 
large readjustments to nominal rates necessitated by  higher rates of Brazilian 
inflation. Discrete devaluations permitted an intervening appreciation of  the 
real rate that discouraged exports and encouraged self-fulfilling speculation. 
Small and frequent mini-devaluations were linked to domestic and external 
inflation, particularly  of  the  United  States,  and  significantly  reduced  the 
variance of the real exchange rate. This system, analyzed more closely in the 
next section, underlies the better Brazilian export performance in the 1970s 
and  1980s. 
manufactured exports based on the product’s IPI rate. 
6.2  Nominal and Real Exchange Rates 
As noted above, the adoption of a crawling peg in 1968 offered an escape 
from the problem of  overvaluation resulting from the higher rates of  price 
increase  in  Brazil  compared  to  its  trade  partners.  The  existence  of  an 
exchange rate policy designed to stabilize real exchange rates is evident from 
the  comparison  between  inflation,  nominal  devaluations,  and  the  real 
exchange rate behavior shown in figure 6.2. 
Real  exchange  rates  measure  competitiveness,  and  they  behave  quite 
differently than nominal exchange rates. The analysis of trade issues, such as 
the performance of the export sector and import growth, requires measures 
of the domestic and international competitiveness of the traded goods sector. 
In this section we  look at different measures of  competitiveness in  Brazil. 
What  matters  for  competitiveness is  prices  relative  to  costs,  and  prices 
relative to the prices offered by  an alternative competing supplier. 
Before proceeding further,  a word  about terminology is warranted.  All 
cruzado prices are denoted by P and p  (the former are foreign, the latter are 
domestic), all foreign currency prices by  (*). The cruzado price of  foreign 
exchange  is  represented  by  E.  As  a  convention  we  conduct  all  price 
comparisons in cruzados and thus translate all foreign currency prices into 
cruzados at the relevant exchange rate.  The different measures of  the real 
exchange rate  are denoted by  e and  a  subscript.  An  increase in  the real 
exchange rate denotes a real appreciation. Conversely, its reduction denotes 
a real depreciation and an increase in competitiveness. 340  Eliana A. Cardoso and Albert Fishlow 
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Fig. 6.2  Real exchange rate (appreciation up) 
The first measure to consider is a broad measure of  cost levels in Brazil 
compared with costs in the rest of the world. As measures of costs we utilize 
economywide wholesale prices.  Brazilian  competitiveness is  enhanced  if 
foreign wholesale prices,  in  cruzados,  rise relative to Brazilian wholesale 
prices.  Denoting  home  and  foreign  wholesale  prices  by  P  and  EP*, 
respectively, we have: 
(1)  e, = PIEP* 
In order to examine the performance of the manufactures export sector, we 
need to develop price measures that indicate whether that sector is gaining 
competitiveness. It is natural to think in  terms of  demand and supply. We 
first  look  at the foreign demand  side for Brazilian  exports  by  comparing 
prices  of  Brazilian  exports  with  those  of  manufactures  of  foreign 
competitors.  The  relevant  price  comparison  is  the  price  of  Brazilian 
manufactured exports, Px, compared with the export price of  manufactures 
of  competitors, EPZ: 
(2)  ed = Px/EP: 
On the supply side, an increase in competitiveness or profitability occurs if 
export prices rise relative to the prices of manufactures in the home market. 
If  so, we would expect increasing amounts of manufactures production to be 
diverted toward exports and away from home sales. A natural measure of 
competitiveness on the supply side, then, is the ratio of  domestic manufac- 
tures price, Px, to the export prices of  Brazilian manufactures: 
(3)  es  = Px  lP, 341  BraziKhapter 6 
Since there are advantages to  sales in the export market relative to the 
domestic market because of the subsidy programs, we include another index 
taking into account the fiscal and credit subsidies: 
(3')  ess = Px  IPXS 
Further  information about real  exchange rates  comes from  the  relative 
price  of  home  goods  and  traded  goods.  This  measures  the  incentive  to 
reallocate resources to the production of  tradables. We  calculate the ratio of 
the  index  of  construction  costs,  pn, which  we  take  as  a  proxy  for  the 
behavior of prices of  home goods, to the domestic price of  industrial goods, 
PA- 
(4)  en, = Pn JP~ 
There exists one more index which is readily available and helps clarify 
further the change in trade performance. That is the index of terms of trade, 
which is simply the ratio of the price index of total imports, P,,  to the price 
index of  total exports, P, ; 
(5)  4  = p, IPtx 
Table 6.2 and figure 6.3 show the different measures of the real exchange 
rate  we  have  introduced above and the terms of  trade between  1970 and 
1986. 
The ratio of  economywide wholesale prices,  e,,  shows relative stability 
from  1970 until  1977. Thereafter,  because  of  depreciation of  the  dollar, 
Brazil gained against other currencies. The devaluation in 1979 extended this 
pattern, but it was reversed in  1981 as a result of the limited devaluation of 
the  cruzeiro  during  the  course  of  1980.  The  appreciation  of  the  dollar 
undermined  the  Brazilian  competitive  position,  a  deterioration  that  was 
finally remedied by  the maxi-devaluation in early 1983. 
The  ratio  of  home  to  traded  goods,  en,, confirms  a  generally  similar 
pattern, with a strong tendency in favor of  tradables after 1979. A principal 
conclusion,  then,  is  that  Brazil's  aggregate  real  exchange  rate  showed 
modest depreciation, but in the face of the decline in the terms of  trade, q, 
after 1977, that may not have been adequate to maintain a strong balance of 
payments.  Debt,  to  some extent,  served  as a  substitute source of  foreign 
exchange. 
A more favorable picture emerges when manufacturing competitiveness is 
considered.  Brazilian  export  prices  fell  relative  to  those  of  competitors 
throughout the period. Such a movement, at the beginning of the period and 
again  after  1982,  possibly  reflects  the  impact  of  Brazilian  subsidies. 
Exporters  could  gain  larger  market  share  by  passing  along  some of  the 
benefits in the form of  final prices. 342  Eliana A. Cardoso and Albert Fishlow 
Table 6.2  Different Measures of  the Real Exchange Rate and the Terms of  Trade in 
Brazil, 1970-86  (1977  = 1) 
Year  ec  ed  e,  e**  e.,  4 
1970  1.059  1.218  1.620  I .95 1  0.936  0.89 
1971  1.059  1.168  1.479  1.732  0.932  0.82 
1972  1.027  1.126  1.380  1.610  0.942  0.87 
1973  0.952  1.092  I .085  1.244  0.977  0.95 
1974  0.929  1.067  0.901  1.024  0.978  0.78 
1975  0.925  1.034  0.986  1.049  0.955  0.76 
1976  0.969  1.025  1.056  1.049  1.101  0.85 
1977  I .ooo  I .ooo  1.000  1  .ooo  1  .ooo  I .oo 
1978  0.896  0.916  1.056  1.049  I.  105  0.86 
1979  0.819  0.815  0.986  1.024  1.153  0.79 
1980  0.766  0.714  0.944  1.024  0.951  0.65 
1981  0.929  0.866  1.127  1.195  0.909  0.55 
1982  0.981  0.941  1.296  1.341  0.896  0.54 
1983  0.812  0.723  1.056  1.122  0.811  0.53 
1984  0.849  0.723  1.056  n.a  0.738  0.58 
1985  0.837  0.714  1.040  n.a  0.803  0.58 
Source:  The statistical appendix, tables A.14 and A.18. 
Nore:  A description of  the  procedures used in  the calculations of  the real exchange rates is found  in  the 
statistical appendix. 
e,  = ratio of wholesale prices of  Brazil and U.S.,  both in cruzados. 
e,  = effective real exchange rate published by Morgan Guaranty. 
e,  = ratio of  domestic manufactures price and export price of  manufactures. 
e,  = same as above, including fiscal and credit subsidies to exporters. 
e,,  = ratio of construction costs and domestic price of  industrial goods. 
q  = terms of trade. 
Such a pattern on the demand side is echoed on the supply side, especially 
when the effect of  subsidies is included. Domestic industrial prices did not 
rise as rapidly as prices of  manufactured exports  up  to  1977. Thereafter, 
however, the incentive to export was attenuated and began to reverse.  By 
1982 there was a significantly greater attraction to domestic sales rather than 
exports,  as  measured  by  prices.  A  fall  in  the  real  volume  of  industrial 
exports between 1981 and 1982 triggered the devaluation in  1983. 
Real depreciation became inevitable as the interest rate shock was added 
to the rise in oil prices,  as well as to the slowdown in the growth of  the 
industrial economies. It added to the real income losses associated with the 
continuing decline in the terms of  trade and loss of  purchasing power over 
imports. One needs only to look at the measures of gross product in dollars 
presented in table A.2 of the statistical appendix to grasp the extent of  the 
loss. On a per capita basis, income in  1985 (again, taking into account the 
terms of trade loss of 5 percent) was less than in 1977! The brunt of the fall 
occurs after 1982 and is also registered in the decline of  real industrial wages 
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Fig. 6.3  Different measures of the real exchange rate 
6.3  Import Performance 
As noted earlier, liberalization efforts after 1964 yielded some advance in 
reducing the relative costs of imports. In conjunction with export subsidies, 
the strong bias in favor of  import substitution was reduced. Although tariffs 
rose modestly in  1969, they were reduced again in 1972. Between 1964 and 
1973 the import ratio actually rose, reversing a long downward tendency. It 
reached its high point in  1974 with large increases in oil imports as well as 
of  other speculative purchases. Thereafter, under the pressure of  persistent 
imbalance in the external accounts, imports have been limited. The ratio of 
imports to product in  1985, at less than 7 percent, is back to its levels of the 
mid-1960s. 
It did not take long for protection to increase after the oil shock. In June 
1974 all forms of import financing for products subject to nominal tariffs of 
55 percent or higher were  suspended; tariff rates for nearly 900 products 
were doubled, and import duty reductions on capital goods were suspended. 
In 1975 tariffs on intermediate goods were raised. Imports subjected to tariff 
rates equal to or higher than 37 percent were made subject to prior payment. 
At  a time when inflation was 30 percent, import legislation imposed a 100 
percent prior deposit rate, without interest, refundable six months after the 
transaction.  In  1976 the economic authorities imposed a complete ban  on 
automobiles, pleasure crafts, toys, and other goods judged to be luxuries. 
Thereafter,  levels of  protection have  not  been  modified  much.  Donald 
Coes (1986) has recently constructed an index of  Brazilian trade liberaliza- 
tion  that  is  graphed  in  figure  6.4.  It  traces  the  dismantling  of  earlier 
liberalization after  1973. By  the early  1980s the degree of  restriction was 
comparable to the last severe balance of payments crisis of the early 1960s. 344  Eliana A. Cardoso and Albert Fishlow 
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Fig. 6.4  Index of trade liberalization in Brazil, 1947-82 
Again,  import protection depends for its  effectiveness on  utilization  of 
nontariff barriers. Table 6.3 shows the legal and implemented average tariff 
rates by  broad categories for  1982. The former are considerable, averaging 
47 percent excluding the nondutiable fuel and wheat imports. The reason is 
straightforward: if  imports  are  permitted  at  all,  they  are  almost  always 
exempt from tariffs or  receive large reductions.  It  is  the license that  has 
again become the binding constraint rather than the price. 
In  table  6.4 these  1982 data  are  classified in  another way  that  further 
illuminates this point. Only 11.3 percent of imports pay the legally stipulated 
rate.  Others enter as  privileged products,  such  as  wheat,  or  by  virtue  of 
special  regional  trade  agreements  involving  preferential  access,  and  still 
others enter by virtue of their priority in connection with exports or domestic 
development projects. There is a large degree of  administrative discretion. 
Import reduction, as we have seen, was a central part of the Brazilian balance 
of payments adjustment after 1980. The relative success of  the policy depended 
not  merely upon  import restriction but also on an active policy of  investment 
directed to import substitution. Despite its limitations, discussed in chapter 3, the 
Brazilian strategy of subsidizing the intermediate and capital goods sectors in the 
1970s did make possible a decline in imported inputs without disrupting domestic 
production. Table  6.5 provides evidence on the  sectoral import coefficients. 
Paper and paper products are an example of not only a more than proportional 
decline in imports, but even of  conversion to exports. Similar transitions have 
occurred in machinery, metals, vehicles, and electrical products. But it is also 
important to point out the role played by the increase in domestic production of 
crude oil. It is the largest source of import saving after 1979. 
These supply adjustments did not permit the Brazilian economy to escape 
unscathed. A severe recession was also necessary in 1982-83  to help restrict 
demand for imports. Declines in investment reduced imports of intermediate 345  BrazilKhapter 6 
Table 6.3  Nominal and Actual Tariff Rates in Brazil, 1982 (weighted averages, in 
percentages) 
Category  Nominal  Actual 
Durable consumer goods 
Nondurable consumer goods 
Construction materials 
Capital goods for industrial usc 
Capital goods for agricultural use 
Transport equipment 
Inputs for industrial use 
Inputs for agricultural use 
Fuels 
Other imports 


























Source:  Moreira and Araujo (1984). 
Table 6.4  Nominal and Actual Tariff Rates for Imports Classified by Tax Regime in 
Brazil, 1982 (weighted averages, in percentages) 
Tax Regime 
Oil  46.7 
Wheat  4.0 
Development programs  5.1 
Products without fiscal exemption  11.3 
Others  18.3 
Total  1m.o 
Share in Total Imports 
Related to exports  9.4 
International agreements  5.3 
Nominal Rate  Actual  Rate 
0.0  0.0 
45.0  0.0 
57.4  0.3 
62.3  0.8 
42.4  7.0 
44.5  44.6 
27.1  0.4 
22.4  5.9 
Source:  Moreira and Araujo (1984). 
and capital goods more than proportionally. A review of  recent research on 
import demand confirms its sensitivity to economic conditions. 
In  table  6.6 we  present  the  findings  of  three  recent  studies.  All  the 
equations show large income elasticities ranging at the low end from 2.3 in 
Abreu (1987) to 2.8 in Moraes (1985), and finally to 3.4 in Dib (1981). It is 
no accident, moreover, given the continuing low level of  imports in recent 
years,  that  the most  contemporary study yields a lower income elasticity. 
Price elasticities tend to be less statistically significant and uniformly lower 
than unity in the most recent studies. 
Moraes takes into account the possibility of  bias due to the existence of 
quantitative restrictions. He assumes that the government looks at the ratio 
between reserves and debt, X.  It restricts imports whenever the ratio is low 
and liberates imports whenever this ratio grows above a desired target. The 
coefficient of  X  appears with  the expected sign  and is  significant, but  its 
inclusion does not affect the other estimated elasticities. 346  Eliana A. Cardoso and Albert Fishlow 
able  6.5  Import Coefficients. Share of  Imported Inputs in the Total Sales of Different 
Industrial Sectors in Brazil, 1974-75  and 1982-83  (in percentages) 




Items for electrical use 
Material for transport 






















Total  7.5  3.8 
Source:  Kume 1985. 
Bble 6.6  Import Equations 













Moraes (1985): period 1976-84;  quarterly data; imports of  manufactured goods; tariffs not included in 
import prices; OLS. 
Income  Relative Price  Lugged Imports  Time Trend 
Coefficients  I .39  -0.30  0.52  -  0.02 
t-statistics  (5.68)  (-2.34)  (5.59)  (-5.59) 
R2  = 0.94  Q(18) = 10.55  SER = 0.08  h  = 0.284 
Abrcu (1987): period 1976-85;  quarterly data; total imports except oil and wheat; MQC. 
Income  Relative Price  Capacity Utilization  Time Trend  Lagged Imports 
Ccefficients  1.58  -  0.33  1.03  -0.018  0.32 
t-statistics  (7.49)  (- 2.93)  (3.55)  (-6.01)  (4.03) 
R2 = 0.96  SER = 0.06  h  =  -0.296 
Abreu introduces capacity utilization as a causal variable as well. The 
response of  imports is positive as utilization increases. That may  measure 
not only lack of domestic supply response but also the strictness of nontariff 
limitations. Licenses are more readily conceded when domestic activity is 
close to full employment. 
Import substitution, as measured by the trend variable, is significant in all 
three versions and has almost identical estimates in the quarterly Moraes and 
Abreu equations. Interestingly, it is highest in the Dib's study for 1960-79 347  BrazilKhapter 6 
rather  than  for  the  more  recent  period.  Thus  the  emphasis  given  to  the 
structural change in  import  substitution in  the early  1980s, which  was  a 
result of  the previous investment in  the  1970s, must be qualified. Abreu’s 
explicit tests for change in the income elasticities in the recent period yielded 
mixed results. In  the annual data there was no evidence of  a shift. For the 
quarterly data, however, one could accept the hypothesis of  a difference in 
1984 and  1985 for capital goods and competitive industrial imports. 
6.4  Export Performance 
Brazilian export performance was central to establishing creditworthiness 
in the 1970s and remains critical for satisfactory debt service in the  1990s. 
Brazil was an attractive debtor not only because of record industrial growth 
from  1968 to  1974 but also because of  improved export results during the 
same period. After stagnation in the 1950s and early 1960s, export receipts 
experienced large increases in the beginning of the 1970s. Despite borrowings 
from the Eurocurrency market, the current account deficit and the debuexport 
ratio remained moderate, confirming Brazil’s creditworthiness. 
Throughout the 1970s Brazilian exports continued to expand, encouraged 
again by  favorable prices after  1975. They were the basis for the import- 
substitution adjustment strategy of  that  decade. Unlike the surge of  indus- 
trialization in the 1950s, exports were given close attention, and the subsidies 
for exports  of  manufactures (described above) substantially countered the 
effects of greater protection and exchange rate overvaluation. A World Bank 
(1983) study found that  for the manufacturing sector as a whole in  1980, 
the  anti-export  bias  was  only  2  percent.  Some  sectors,  however,  most 
prominently  transport  equipment,  actually received  greater  rewards  from 
exports. 
Favorable prices  for agricultural commodities, along with  a  shift in  the 
composition  of  exports  toward  fast-growing  industrial  products,  were 
important factors in the improved export performance of  the  1970s. From 
1970 to  1979, total receipts increased from $2.7 billion to $15.2 billion. 
Price increases in primary exports accounted for almost 40 percent of  this 
rise in value; real growth in industrial exports accounted for almost another 
20  percent.  Table 6.7 shows this change in  the  structure of  exports  from 
1965 to 1985. 
Coffee alone accounted for almost half of  export earnings in  1965, while 
manufactured goods accounted for less than  10 percent. Twenty years later 
the proportions were reversed. Within the category of manufactured exports, 
as table 6.8 shows, the transformation was of three kinds. First, there was a 
large increase in more traditional exports, footwear in particular. This was 
especially true after 1975. Second, there was an emergence of new sectors 
after 1975, such as paper and chemical products, that had previously been 
exclusively import  substituting. Third,  and  not  made explicit in  the table, 348  Eliana A. Cardoso and Albert Fishlow 
Table 6.7  Composiion of  Exports (as a percentage of total exports) 
1965  1970  1975  1980  1985 
coffee beans  44.3  34.3  9.9  12.4  9.1 
Other primary goods  37.3  40.8  48. I  29.8  24.2 
Semimanufactured goods  9.6  9.1  9.8  11.7  10.8 
Manufactured gwds  8.1  14.9  29.8  44.8  54.9 
Spccial transactions  0.7  0.9  2.4  1.3  1  .O 
Source:  Boletim do Banco Central. 
%ble  6.8  Composition of  Manufactured Exports (as a percentage of  total 
manufactured exports) 
1965  1970  1975  1980  1985 
Footwear and textiles  6.7  7.8  17.9  11.1  11.7 
Industrialized agricultural products  23.0  24.1  17.0  15.5  13.6 
Chemical products  0.0  2.9  2.6  7.8  11.9 
Metal and mechanical products  27.6  32.4  26.2  29.0  26.3 
Paper and cardboard  0.1  0.1  1.1  2.1  2.3 
Other  42.6  32.7  35.2  34.5  34.2 
Source:  Boletim do Banco Central. 
there was a shift over time within categories to more sophisticated industrial 
exports. For example, the export of entire vehicles replaced auto parts,  and 
the  export  of  steel replaced pig  iron.  In  addition,  entirely new  products 
emerged in the export market, such as airplanes. 
Despite the relatively strong performance of exports throughout the 1970s, 
especially considering the emphasis given to import substitution from 1975 
on, there is a significant change in the rhythm of  export performance after 
the middle of the decade. A recent decomposition of the sources of Brazilian 
export growth brings out the difference. The results are presented in table 6.9. 
Note  that  in  the  1974-78  period,  Brazilian exports  are  more  influenced 
by  world trade growth than by  increased market share. The participation of 
total Brazilian exports in world trade (excluding fuels), after rising sharply 
from the late 1960s to 1977, falls off thereafter; the 1979 level is lower than 
Table 6.9  Source of Growth of  Exports (as a percentage of total change) 
Total (excluding fuel)  Manufactured 
1971178  1971174  1974178  1971178  1971174  1974178 
Growth-of-world-trade  effect  71.4  64.8  100.9  30.2  33.1  57.2 
Composition-of-exports  effect  -  9.0  -0.1  -20.0  -0.1  -0.2  -0.1 
Destination-of-exports  effect  -  1.5  -  13.6  1.0  -3.9  -4.5  -0.2 
Competitiveness  effect  39.1  48.9  18.1  73.8  70.6  42.7 
Source:  Horta 1985. 349  BrazilKhapter 6 
in  1973. Gains in manufactured products continued, but at a slower rate. The 
consequence is a notable slowing in the real growth of  exports after 1974, 
both the total and that of manufactured products alone. 
In  the  1980s, after the  second  oil  shock,  the  deterioration of  primary 
product prices,  along  with  slowing world  trade  growth,  hit  Brazil hard. 
Export receipts followed a more irregular pattern than before, falling from 
1981 to  1982,  and  after  a  sharp rise  in  1984, again declining.  In  1987 
exports were only 10 percent greater than in 1980. The value of world nonoil 
trade grew by more than 30 percent in the same interval, hence the Brazilian 
share fell, but only after 1984. 
The volume of Brazilian exports grew at a rate of about 5.6  percent a year 
from  1980 to  1986,  while  prices  have  declined  by  3.5 percent.  Brazil’s 
performance  is  inferior to  that  of  nonfuel  developing country  exporters, 
whose volume has expanded at a rate of  6.5 percent. In addition Brazil has 
experienced a larger decline in export prices, almost 1 percent a year. The 
most  dramatic  difference,  however,  emerges  in  a  comparison  with  the 
performance of the principal developing country exporters of manufactures, 
whose volume expanded by  more than 8 percent a year and whose terms of 
trade actually improved over this period. 
Just when the close of capital markets forced the debt service burden more 
substantially  upon  export  receipts,  Brazilian  Performance  became  more 
erratic and less competitive despite real devaluation. Part of  the reason for 
this is the continued, although diminished, importance of  primary exports 
subject to a pronounced fall in prices. Another part is the strong recovery in 
internal demand after 1984. 
Table 6.10 presents some estimates of  the response of Brazilian manufac- 
tured exports to relative prices and domestic capacity utilization. Although it 
is clear that  Brazilian exports  do adjust to relative prices with elasticities 
considerably larger than unity, and hence are sensitive to exchange rate and 
subsidy policies,  it is also  the  case that  strong internal demand typically 
subtracts from export supply in a significant way. The decline after 1984 in 
the  volume  of  industrialized exports  owes  itself  to this  factor.  Brazilian 
exports of  manufactured products are still relatively small compared to the 
size of  the internal market. Overall, the ratio is approximately 10 percent 
compared  with  values of  roughly  50 percent for Korea and  Taiwan. This 
difference  explains  much  about  post-1984  export  performance  in  these 
countries.  For  the  Asian  nations,  exports  and  production  are  virtually 
synonymous; trade penetration and industrialization are interlinked. 
6.5  Conclusions 
A central element in the Brazilian capacity to service its debt is its trade 
performance. Large trade surpluses since 1984 have been achieved primarily 
as a result of  continued import compression rather than regular growth of 350  Eliana A. Cardoso and Albert Fishlow 
Table 6.10  Export Equations 
Coes (1986):  period 1959-77;  OLS; all variables in  logs; r-statistics in parentheses 
x  = ratio of manufactured exports to total industrial production. 
p  = world price of  manufactures adjusted by the Musalem incentive series and home industrial prices. 
b = measure of  excess capacity. 
x  =  -3.78  + 1.67~  - 0.018b 
(-2.82)  (6.17) (-2.88) 
R2  = .I4  D.W.  = 1.92 




P,  = world price of  Brazilian manufactures. 
P  = world income. 
P* = price of  competing manufactures. 
= quantum of manufactured exports. 
= world price of Brazilian manufactured exports adjusted by  the Cardoso incentive series and home 
= measure of excess capacity. 
industrial prices. 
X  = - 1.9 -k  2.5e - 1.5B 
(11.7)(-2.1) 
P, =  -1.4 -  0.1X  + 0.5Y'  + P* 
R2  = 0.97  MSE  = 1.7 
exports  accompanied  by  expanding  import  capacity.  This  makes  an 
important difference in developmental consequences, as we elaborate in the 
next chapter. 
The initial conditions of  a large trade surplus tend to create an  illusory 
optimism about the ease with which large external transfers of  resources can 
be realized. Applying even differential compound rates of growth to exports 
and  imports leaves a  scope for larger trade surpluses in  the future.  Such 
exercises are applications of  arithmetic rather than economic analysis. 
That analysis suggests a more cautious view, One question is the degree of 
Brazilian competitiveness required for large and regular growth of manufac- 
tured exports. To the extent that competitiveness can only be achieved in the 
short term through real devaluation and hence declining real wages, political 
feasibility also becomes a major factor. At recent low rates of investment and 
imports, Brazilian technological capacity is handicapped vis-A-vis  strength- 
ened Asian NIC competitors. 
A second question deals with the prices of primary exports. An end to the 
abrupt decline experienced since 1979, the most serious such decline during 
the  postwar period,  would  be  an  important  boost  to  Brazilian prospects. 
Despite dollar devaluation,  primary export  prices have  not risen  steadily, 
while  those  of  manufactured products  have  done  so.  Current  projections 
forecast  some  modest  relief  in  the  next  few  years,  but  they  have  been 
consistently wrong in the last several. 351  BrazilKhapter 7 
Third, the continued imbalance in the payments of  the industrial countries 
threatens expansion of world trade in two ways. One is a recession induced by 
restrictive macroeconomic policies in the United States unmatched by expansion 
in Germany and Japan; the other is rising protectionism and increased attention to 
bilateral trade balance that limit the scope for debtor country import penetration. 
Fourth, on the import side, there may  be  an overestimate of  the structural 
reduction in Brazilian income elasticities owing to the large program of import 
substitution. Artificially low investment, despite income recovery in  1985 and 
1986, has helped to keep import demand in check. But such a pattern cannot be 
projected, nor is it consistent with sustained development. Export growth itself 
becomes dependent upon access to imports. Brazilian ability to generate large 
trade surpluses due to previous investment should not be exaggerated. 
Taken together with recent experience, these considerations suggest that 
Brazilian trade performance and policy are not settled issues. It will require a 
sustained  effort  to  assure  that  export  growth  occurs  in  a  more  regular 
fashion. It will also require careful attention to assure that import limitations 
and emphasis upon the internal market do not, in the end, worsen rather than 
improve the  balance of  payments.  In  the  last  analysis,  meaningful trade 
projections cannot be made within the context of  debt service requirements 
alone. A broader perspective, incorporating the debt as an integral part of the 
Brazilian development problem, is necessary. 
7  Epilogue: Debt and 
Development 
Thus far we have stressed the problems of macroeconomic adjustment to the 
large Brazilian external debt. Debt service has imposed new demands upon 
trade performance and upon  the public  sector. The former has responded 
better than the latter. Since 1984, record export surpluses have been attained. 
Fiscal deficits and  inflationary pressures have persisted,  however, and the 
Cruzado Plan, despite its promising start, has failed. Once again, while trade 
surpluses have recovered  to  the  $10 billion level,  inflation  exceeded 400 
percent in  1987. Instead of external and internal equilibrium being joint, the 
strong balance  of  trade  has  been  gained,  to  some extent,  at  the  cost  of 
domestic imbalance. 
But  the  debt  problem  goes  even  deeper.  It  is  rapidly  evolving  into 
the central problem  of  economic development in  the  1990s. After  almost 
a  decade  of  slower  growth  to  facilitate  adjustment  through  limited 
imports, future prospects are dimmed by low rates of investment since 1982. 